nProtect APPGuard安卓反外挂分析
发布时间: 2017-11-08分类:系统安全/os_security热度: 4605
工具与环境:
IDA7.0
JEB2.2.5
Nexus 5
Android 4.4
目录:
一:app简单分析与java层反编译
二: compatible.so反调试与反反调试
三: compatible.so注册jni函数分析
四: stub.so反调试与反反调试
五: stub.so注册jni函数分析
六: Assembly-CSharp.dll解密分析
七: libengine模块分析
八：总结
一:app简单分析与java层反编译
整体图:
1.最近在学习手游保护方面的技术，本文是学习过程中分析某反外挂的一点记录，高手莫要见笑，有不对的地方还请指教，首先简单通过资源目录中文件名做基本了解，
在lib目录中有libmono.so、libunity.so，资源目录中存在(assets\bin\Data\Managed\Assembly-CSharp.dll)，应该是unity 3D编写，通过反编译发现该文件己被加密，在资源目录下armeabi文件夹中还存放着libengine.sox与libstub.sox文件，看名字猜测很可能这两个文件就是反外挂其中的一些模块了，在看看lib目录下只有libcompatible.so模块比较可疑。如下图所示:
当我们用调试器附加游戏程进时会有如下提示：
被发现有调试器附加，下节我们将分析它的反调试机制。
2.通过JEB反编译来看看大致流程，反编译后先找到application类，代码如下图：
主要是加载so模块，so名称字符串被加密了，解密出来后so名称"compatible",将compatible.so放到IDA中反编译发现函数名被混淆了，字符串己加密，如下图：
通过以上简单分析，我们主要关注的重点关注的模块主要有lib目录下的libcompatible.so与资源目录中的libengine.sox与libstub.sox，还有就是发现java层的字符串与函数名都被混淆，so模块中的字符串也函数名也被混淆。
3.拷贝资源,解密libstub.sox并加载 。
在Lcom/inca/security/Core/AppGuardEngine初始函数<init>(Landroid/content/Context;Lcom/inca/security/AppGuard/AppGuardEventListener;Z)V中将判断X86或ARM平台并将对应的\assets\appguard中的libengine.sox、libstub.sox、update.dat拷贝到程序安装目录。JEB未能正常反编译出java代码,看smali代码。
1 :1946 2 00001946 const/4 v9, 3 3 00001948 if-ge v6, v9, :1C16 4 :194C 5 0000194C invoke-static Binder->getABI()I 6 00001952 move-result v6 7 00001954 move-object/from16 v0, p0 8 00001958 move-object/from16 v1, p1 9 0000195C invoke-virtual AppGuardEngine->iiIIIiiiIi(Context, I)Z, v0, v1, v6 # 拷贝资源 10 00001962 move-result v6 11 00001964 if-eqz v6, :1BE0 12 :1968 13 00001968 new-instance v6, qb 14 0000196C invoke-static JNISoxProxy->getContext()Context 15 00001972 move-result-object v9 16 00001974 invoke-direct qb-><init>(Context)V, v6, v9 17 0000197A const-string v9, "fChY~_h\u0004yEr" # libstub.sox 18 0000197E invoke-virtual qb->iiIIIiiiIi([B)V, v6, v8 19 00001984 invoke-static b->iiIIIiiiIi(String)String, v9 20 0000198A move-result-object v9 21 0000198C const-string v10, "j\u000Fd\u0015r\u0013dHu\t" # libstub.so 22 00001990 invoke-static yb->iiIIIiiiIi(String)String, v10 23 00001996 move-result-object v10 24 00001998 const/4 v11, 0 25 0000199A invoke-virtual qb->iiIIIiiiIi(String, String, [B)Z, v6, v9, v10, v11 # 解密libstub.sox((最终传入so层解密private static native byte[] iIiIIIiIiI(byte[] arg0, int arg1))) 26 000019A0 move-result v6 27 000019A2 if-eqz v6, :1BE0 28 :19A6 29 000019A6 new-instance v6, File 30 000019AA new-instance v9, StringBuilder 31 000019AE invoke-direct StringBuilder-><init>()V, v9 32 000019B4 const/4 v10, 0 33 000019B6 invoke-static JNISoxProxy->getContext()Context 34 000019BC move-result-object v11 35 000019BE invoke-virtual Context->getFilesDir()File, v11 36 000019C4 move-result-object v11 37 000019C6 invoke-virtual File->getAbsolutePath()String, v11 38 000019CC move-result-object v11 39 000019CE invoke-virtual StringBuilder->insert(I, String)StringBuilder, v9, v10, v11 40 000019D4 move-result-object v9 41 000019D6 const-string v10, "%FcHy^\u007FH$Ye" # /libstub.so 42 000019DA invoke-static b->iiIIIiiiIi(String)String, v10 43 000019E0 move-result-object v10 44 000019E2 invoke-virtual StringBuilder->append(String)StringBuilder, v9, v10 45 000019E8 move-result-object v9 46 000019EA invoke-virtual StringBuilder->toString()String, v9 47 000019F0 move-result-object v9 48 000019F2 invoke-direct File-><init>(String)V, v6, v9 49 000019F8 invoke-virtual File->exists()Z, v6 50 :19FE 51 000019FE move-result v9 52 00001A00 if-eqz v9, :1BE0 53 :1A04 54 00001A04 invoke-virtual File->getAbsolutePath()String, v6 55 00001A0A move-result-object v9 56 00001A0C invoke-static System->load(String)V, v9 # 加载指定路径的SO 57 00001A12 invoke-direct/range AppGuardEngine->lllIIIlllI(Context)V, p0 .. p1 # 调用Native 58 :1A18 59 00001A18 invoke-virtual File->delete()Z, v6 60 00001A1E new-instance v6, File 61 00001A22 new-instance v9, StringBuilder 62 00001A26 invoke-direct StringBuilder-><init>()V, v9 63 00001A2C const/4 v10, 0 64 00001A2E invoke-static JNISoxProxy->getContext()Context 65 00001A34 move-result-object v11 66 00001A36 invoke-virtual Context->getFilesDir()File, v11 67 00001A3C move-result-object v11 68 00001A3E invoke-virtual File->getAbsolutePath()String, v11 69 00001A44 move-result-object v11 70 00001A46 invoke-virtual StringBuilder->insert(I, String)StringBuilder, v9, v10, v11 71 00001A4C move-result-object v9 72 00001A4E const-string v10, ")\no\u0004u\u0012s\u0004(\u0015i\u001E" # /libstub.sox 73 00001A52 invoke-static yb->iiIIIiiiIi(String)String, v10 74 00001A58 move-result-object v10 75 00001A5A invoke-virtual StringBuilder->append(String)StringBuilder, v9, v10 76 00001A60 move-result-object v9 77 00001A62 invoke-virtual StringBuilder->toString()String, v9 78 00001A68 move-result-object v9 79 00001A6A invoke-direct File-><init>(String)V, v6, v9 80 00001A70 invoke-virtual File->delete()Z, v6
4. 解密libstub.sox模块。
解密函数在类com/inca/security/qb中iiIIIiiiIi函数，代码如下:
1 @SuppressLint(value={"SdCardPath"}) public boolean iiIIIiiiIi(String arg25, String arg26, byte[] arg27) throws IOException, InvalidKeyException { 2 Object v18;
3 Object v5_2;
4 long v16_1;
5 Method v8_3;
6 Class v11_2;
7 Object v7_2;
8 Object v4_7;
9 Method v15; // doFinal
10 Method v14_1; // init java.security.Key
11 Object v13_1; // RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding
12 int v8_1;
13 int v7;
14 FileInputStream v13;
15 Method v4_6;
16 byte[] v7_1;
17 boolean v4_2;
18 Method v5_1; // read
19 byte[] v12;
20 byte[] v11;
21 Object v10; // /
22 Class v9; // java.io.FileInputStream
23 try {
24 v9 = Class.forName(vb.iiIIIiiiIi("&3:3b;#|\n; 7\u0005<<\'8\u00018 )3!")); // java.io.FileInputStream
25 Constructor v4_1 = v9.getConstructor(String.class);
26 v10 = v4_1.newInstance(arg25.indexOf(yb.iiIIIiiiIi("I")) == 0 ? arg25 : new StringBuilder().insert(0, this.iiIiiiIIIi).append(arg25).toString()); // /
27 v11 = new byte[16];
28 v12 = new byte[4];
29 v5_1 = v9.getMethod(vb.iiIIIiiiIi(" )3("), byte[].class, Integer.TYPE, Integer.TYPE); // read
30 v5_1.invoke(v10, v11, Integer.valueOf(0), Integer.valueOf(3));
31 if(v11[0] == 83 && v11[1] == 79 && v11[2] == 88) { // 判断开头是否为SOX
32 goto label_82;
33 }
34
35 v4_2 = false;
36 return v4_2;
37 }
38 catch(Exception v4) {
39 goto label_78;
40 }
41
42 label_82:
43 int v4_3 = 3;
44 try {
45 v5_1.invoke(v10, v11, Integer.valueOf(0), Integer.valueOf(2));
46 if((((short)((((short)v11[0])) | (((short)v11[1])) << 8))) != 1) {
47 return false;
48 }
49
50 v5_1.invoke(v10, v11, Integer.valueOf(0), Integer.valueOf(1));
51 v5_1.invoke(v10, v11, Integer.valueOf(0), Integer.valueOf(2));
52 v5_1.invoke(v10, v11, Integer.valueOf(0), Integer.valueOf(2));
53 v5_1.invoke(v10, v11, Integer.valueOf(0), Integer.valueOf(4));
54 v5_1.invoke(v10, v11, Integer.valueOf(0), Integer.valueOf(4));
55 v5_1.invoke(v10, v12, Integer.valueOf(0), Integer.valueOf(4));
56 v5_1.invoke(v10, v11, Integer.valueOf(0), Integer.valueOf(12));
57 v5_1.invoke(v10, v11, Integer.valueOf(0), Integer.valueOf(16));
58 v5_1.invoke(v10, v11, Integer.valueOf(0), Integer.valueOf(16));
59 byte[] v4_5 = null;
60 if(v11[0] == 0 || v11[1] == 0 || v11[14] == 0 || v11[15] == 0) {
61 v7_1 = v4_5;
62 v4_6 = v5_1;
63 goto label_291;
64 label_276:
65 while(v7 < 64) {
66 v13.read(v11);
67 if(v8_1 == v14) {
68 v4_5 = new byte[16];
69 System.arraycopy(v11, 0, v4_5, 0, 16);
70 }
71
72 v7 = v8_1 + 1;
73 v8_1 = v7;
74 }
75
76 v13.close();
77 v7_1 = v4_5;
78 v4_6 = v5_1;
79 }
80 else {
81 File v8 = new File(String.format(yb.iiIIIiiiIi("CuI#\u0015(\u0012v\r"), arg25.substring(0, arg25.lastIndexOf(47)), qb.iiIIIiiiIi(v11))); // %s/%s.tpk
82 if(v8.exists()) {
83 v13 = new FileInputStream(v8);
84 v13.read(v11);
85 int v14 = (Math.abs(v11[0] << 24 | v11[4] << 16 | v11[8] << 8 | v11[12]) + 1) % 64;
86 v7 = 1;
87 v8_1 = 1;
88 goto label_276;
89 }
90 else {
91 return false;
92 }
93 }
94
95 label_291:
96 v4_6.invoke(v10, v11, Integer.valueOf(0), Integer.valueOf(4));
97 v4_5 = new byte[(v11[3] & 255) << 24 | 0 | (v11[2] & 255) << 16 | (v11[1] & 255) << 8 | v11[0] & 255];
98 v5_1 = v9.getMethod(vb.iiIIIiiiIi(" )3("), byte[].class); // read
99 v5_1.invoke(v10, v4_5);
100 Class v8_2 = Class.forName(yb.iiIIIiiiIi("\fg\u0010g\u001E(\u0005t\u001Fv\u0012iHE\u000Fv\u000Ec\u0014")); // javax.crypto.Cipher
101 Method v11_1 = v8_2.getMethod(vb.iiIIIiiiIi("+78\u001B\"!83\"1)"), String.class); // getInstance
102 v13_1 = v11_1.invoke(null, yb.iiIIIiiiIi("T5GIC%DIV-E576g\u0002b\u000Fh\u0001")); // RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding
103 v14_1 = v8_2.getMethod(vb.iiIIIiiiIi(";\";8"), Integer.TYPE, Class.forName(yb.iiIIIiiiIi("\fg\u0010gHu\u0003e\u0013t\u000Fr\u001F(-c\u001F"))); // init java.security.Key
104 v14_1.invoke(v13_1, Integer.valueOf(2), this.iIiIIiIiIi);
105 v15 = v8_2.getMethod(vb.iiIIIiiiIi("(=\n;\"3 "), byte[].class); // doFinal
106 v4_7 = v15.invoke(v13_1, v4_5);
107 if(v7_1 != null) {
108 v13_1 = v11_1.invoke(null, yb.iiIIIiiiIi("\'C5")); // AES
109 v14_1.invoke(v13_1, Integer.valueOf(2), Class.forName(vb.iiIIIiiiIi("&3:34|/ 5\"8=b!<7/|\u001F7/ )&\u000775\u0001<7/")).getConstructor(byte[].class, String.class).newInstance(v7_1, yb.iiIIIiiiIi("\'C5"))); // javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec AES
110 v4_7 = v15.invoke(v13_1, v4_7);
111 }
112
113 v7_2 = null;
114 v7_2 = v11_1.invoke(v7_2, vb.iiIIIiiiIi("\r\u0017\u001F"));
115 v14_1.invoke(v7_2, Integer.valueOf(2), Class.forName(yb.iiIIIiiiIi("\fg\u0010g\u001E(\u0005t\u001Fv\u0012iHu\u0016c\u0005(5c\u0005t\u0003r-c\u001FU\u0016c\u0005")).getConstructor(byte[].class, String.class).newInstance(v4_7, vb.iiIIIiiiIi("\r\u0017\u001F")));
116 v11_2 = Class.forName(yb.iiIIIiiiIi("\fg\u0010gHo\t($\u007F\u0012c\'t\u0014g\u001FI\u0013r\u0016s\u0012U\u0012t\u0003g\u000B"));
117 v13_1 = v11_2.getConstructor(null).newInstance(null);
118 byte[] v14_2 = new byte[1024];
119 v15 = v8_2.getMethod(vb.iiIIIiiiIi("\'<6-&)"), byte[].class, Integer.TYPE, Integer.TYPE);
120 Method v16 = v11_2.getMethod(yb.iiIIIiiiIi("\u0011t\u000Fr\u0003"), byte[].class);
121 for(v4_6 = v5_1; true; v4_6 = v5_1) {
122 v4_3 = v4_6.invoke(v10, v14_2).intValue();
123 if(v4_3 == -1) {
124 break;
125 }
126
127 v16.invoke(v13_1, v15.invoke(v7_2, v14_2, Integer.valueOf(0), Integer.valueOf(v4_3)));
128 }
129
130 v16.invoke(v13_1, v8_2.getMethod(vb.iiIIIiiiIi("(=\n;\"3 "), null).invoke(v7_2, null));
131 v4_7 = v11_2.getMethod(yb.iiIIIiiiIi("\u0012i$\u007F\u0012c\'t\u0014g\u001F"), null).invoke(v13_1, null);
132 if(arg25.indexOf(vb.iiIIIiiiIi("c")) != 0) {
133 arg26 = new StringBuilder().insert(0, this.iiIiiiIIIi).append(arg26).toString();
134 }
135
136 Class v7_3 = Class.forName(yb.iiIIIiiiIi("l\u0007p\u0007(\u000FiH@\u000Fj\u0003I\u0013r\u0016s\u0012U\u0012t\u0003g\u000B"));
137 v8_3 = v7_3.getMethod(vb.iiIIIiiiIi("; %&)"), byte[].class);
138 v14_1 = v7_3.getMethod(yb.iiIIIiiiIi("\u0005j\tu\u0003"), null);
139 v15 = v7_3.getMethod(vb.iiIIIiiiIi("*>9!$"), null);
140 v7_2 = v7_3.getConstructor(String.class).newInstance(arg26);
141 v16_1 = na.iIIIiiiIII(((byte[])v4_7), 5);
142 v5_2 = null;
143 }
144 catch(Exception v4) {
145 goto label_78;
146 }
147
148 try {
149 v18 = Binder.getReserved1();
150 if(v18 == null) {
151 goto label_761;
152 }
153 }
154 catch(Exception v4) {
155 goto label_760;
156 }
157
158 try {
159 v5_2 = v18.getClass().getMethod(yb.iiIIIiiiIi("o/o/O\u000Fo/o/"), byte[].class, Integer.TYPE).invoke(v18, v4_7, Integer.valueOf(((int)v16_1)));
160 }
161 catch(Exception v4) {
162 try {
163 v4.printStackTrace();
164 goto label_659;
165 label_761:
166 byte[] v5_3 = AppGuardEngine.iiIIIiiiIi(((byte[])v4_7), ((int)v16_1)); // 传入SO层解密 （该Native函数在compatible.so进行动态注册）
167 label_760:
168 }
169 catch(Exception v4) {
170 goto label_760;
171 }
172 }
173
174 label_659:
175 v4_3 = 3;
176 try {
177 int v12_1 = v12[0] & 255 | ((v12[v4_3] & 255) << 24 | 0 | (v12[2] & 255) << 16 | (v12[1] & 255) << 8);
178 Class v16_2 = Class.forName(vb.iiIIIiiiIi("&3:3b\'8; |6;<|\r6 7>a~"));
179 Object v17 = v16_2.getConstructor(null).newInstance(null);
180 v16_2.getMethod(yb.iiIIIiiiIi("s\u0016b\u0007r\u0003"), byte[].class, Integer.TYPE, Integer.TYPE).invoke(v17, v5_2, Integer.valueOf(0), Integer.valueOf(v5_2.length));
181 v16_1 = v16_2.getMethod(vb.iiIIIiiiIi("5)&\u001A3 \')"), null).invoke(v17, null).longValue();
182 if(v12_1 != 0 && v12_1 != (((int)v16_1))) {
183 v14_1.invoke(v7_2, null);
184 v4_2 = false;
185 }
186 else {
187 v8_3.invoke(v7_2, v5_2);
188 v15.invoke(v7_2, null);
189 v14_1.invoke(v7_2, null);
190 v9.getMethod(yb.iiIIIiiiIi("\u0005j\tu\u0003"), null).invoke(v10, null);
191 v11_2.getMethod(vb.iiIIIiiiIi("/>#!)"), null).invoke(v13_1, null);
192 v9.getMethod(yb.iiIIIiiiIi("\u0005j\tu\u0003"), null).invoke(v10, null);
193 v4_2 = true;
194 }
195
196 return v4_2;
197 }
198 catch(Exception v4) {
199 label_78:
200 Exception v5_4 = v4;
201 v4_2 = false;
202 v5_4.printStackTrace();
203 return v4_2;
204 }
205 }
java层AES解密再传入传入so层解密private static native byte[] iIiIIIiIiI(byte[] arg0, int arg1)。
5. 解密libengine.sox模块
在Lcom/inca/security/Core/AppGuardEngine;->iiIIIiiiIi([B)Z生成一个随机数后SHA1后字会串做为解密后的文件名存放在/data/data/包名/files/目录下,解密函数与上一步相同。
生成随机数代码:
1 .method private synthetic iiIIIiiiIi([B)Z
2 .registers 12
3 .annotation build SuppressLint
4 value = {
5 "TrulyRandom"
6 }
7 .end annotation
8 .annotation system Throws
9 value = {
10 AppGuardException
11 }
12 .end annotation
13 00000000 const/4 v9, 2
14 00000002 const/16 v8, -0x007E
15 00000006 const/16 v7, 0x0030
16 0000000A const/4 v2, 0
17 0000000C const/4 v3, 1
18 :E
19 0000000E const-string v1, "U.GW" # SHA1
20 00000012 invoke-static yb->iiIIIiiiIi(String)String, v1
21 00000018 move-result-object v1
22 0000001A invoke-static MessageDigest->getInstance(String)MessageDigest, v1
23 :20
24 00000020 move-result-object v1
25 :22
26 00000022 new-instance v4, SecureRandom
27 00000026 invoke-direct SecureRandom-><init>()V, v4
28 0000002C const/16 v5, 0x0100
29 00000030 new-array v5, v5, [B
30 00000034 const/16 v6, 0x0126
31 00000038 invoke-virtual SecureRandom->nextBytes([B)V, v4, v5
32 0000003E invoke-virtual MessageDigest->update([B)V, v1, v5
33 00000044 invoke-virtual SecureRandom->nextBytes([B)V, v4, v5
34 0000004A invoke-virtual MessageDigest->update([B)V, v1, v5
35 00000050 new-instance v4, BigInteger
36 00000054 invoke-virtual MessageDigest->digest()[B, v1
37 0000005A move-result-object v1
38 0000005C invoke-direct BigInteger-><init>(I, [B)V, v4, v3, v1
39 00000062 const/16 v1, 0x0010
40 00000066 invoke-virtual BigInteger->toString(I)String, v4, v1 # 随机数后SHA1值
41 0000006C move-result-object v1
42 0000006E iput-object v1, p0, AppGuardEngine->IiIIiiiiii_Random_SHA1:String # 解密后文件名
43 //解密并调用
44 00000D7A new-instance v4, qb
45 00000D7E invoke-static JNISoxProxy->getContext()Context
46 00000D84 move-result-object v5
47 00000D86 invoke-direct qb-><init>(Context)V, v4, v5
48 00000D8C const-string v5, "fChOdMcDo\u0004yEr" # libengine.sox
49 00000D90 invoke-virtual qb->iiIIIiiiIi([B)V, v4, v1
50 00000D96 invoke-static b->iiIIIiiiIi(String)String, v5
51 00000D9C move-result-object v1
52 00000D9E iget-object v5, p0, AppGuardEngine->IiIIiiiiii_Random_SHA1:String
53 00000DA2 const/4 v6, 0
54 00000DA4 invoke-virtual qb->iiIIIiiiIi(String, String, [B)Z, v4, v1, v5, v6 # 解密libengine.sox(最终传入so层解密private static native byte[] iIiIIIiIiI(byte[] arg0, int arg1))
55 :DAA
56 00000DAA move-object v0, p0
57 :DAC
58 00000DAC invoke-static JNISoxProxy->getContext()Context
59 00000DB2 move-result-object v1
60 00000DB4 new-instance v4, StringBuilder
61 00000DB8 invoke-direct StringBuilder-><init>()V, v4
62 00000DBE invoke-static JNISoxProxy->getContext()Context
63 00000DC4 move-result-object v5
64 00000DC6 invoke-virtual Context->getFilesDir()File, v5
65 00000DCC move-result-object v5
66 00000DCE invoke-virtual File->getAbsolutePath()String, v5
67 00000DD4 move-result-object v5
68 00000DD6 invoke-virtual StringBuilder->insert(I, String)StringBuilder, v4, v2, v5
69 00000DDC move-result-object v4
70 00000DDE const-string v5, "%" # /
71 00000DE2 invoke-static b->iiIIIiiiIi(String)String, v5
72 00000DE8 move-result-object v5
73 00000DEA invoke-virtual StringBuilder->append(String)StringBuilder, v4, v5
74 00000DF0 move-result-object v4
75 00000DF2 iget-object v5, p0, AppGuardEngine->IiIIiiiiii_Random_SHA1:String
76 00000DF6 invoke-virtual StringBuilder->append(String)StringBuilder, v4, v5
77 00000DFC move-result-object v4
78 00000DFE invoke-virtual StringBuilder->toString()String, v4
79 00000E04 move-result-object v4
80 00000E06 invoke-direct AppGuardEngine->IIIIIIIlIl(Context, String, [B)I, v0, v1, v4, p1 # 将解密后将libengine文件路径传入该Native函数中调用
81 00000E0C move-result v1
82 00000E0E if-gez v1, :E9A
解密后的so会在Native函数中通过dlopen、dlsym来调用。
二: compatible.so反调试与反反调试
1. 反调试 (文件偏移 13284)
1 /data/app-lib/com.digitalsky.girlsfrontline.cn-1/libcompatible.so 757C8000 0005F000
2 .text:757DB284 loc_757DB284 ; CODE XREF: JNI_OnLoad+254↑j
3 .text:757DB284 00 00 5C E3 CMP R12, #0
4 .text:757DB288 18 00 00 BA BLT loc_757DB2F0
5 .text:757DB28C 00 30 68 E2 RSB R3, R8, #0
6 .text:757DB290 03 00 20 E0 EOR R0, R0, R3
7 .text:757DB294 08 80 80 E0 ADD R8, R0, R8
8 .text:757DB298 0D 00 58 E3 CMP R8, #0xD ; 判断SDK版本
9 .text:757DB29C 9F FF FF DA BLE loc_757DB120
10 .text:757DB2A0
11 .text:757DB2A0 loc_757DB2A0 ; CODE XREF: JNI_OnLoad+2E4↓j
12 .text:757DB2A0 7D 2B 00 EB BL _Z11lIlIlIIIIIIv ; 创建3进程和多线程反调试
13 .text:757DB2A4 00 20 50 E2 SUBS R2, R0, #0 ; char *
如果SDK大于0XD时就创建3进程与多线程反调试:
1.text:756F84B0 EXPORT _Z11IIIIIIIllllv
2.text:756F84B0 _Z11IIIIIIIllllv;CODE XREF: JNI_OnLoad:loc_756EE6E4↑p
3.text:756F84B0
4.text:756F84B0 var_2C= -0x2C
5.text:756F84B0 var_28= -0x28
6.text:756F84B0 var_24= -0x24
7.text:756F84B0 var_20= -0x20
8.text:756F84B0
9.text:756F84B0;__unwind {
10.text:756F84B0 F0432D E9 STMFD SP!, {R4-R9,LR}
11.text:756F84B4 C0439F E5 LDR R4, =(_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ - 0x756F84C8)
12.text:756F84B8 C0239F E5 LDR R2, =(__stack_chk_guard_ptr - 0x7572FED0)
13.text:756F84BC C0339F E5 LDR R3, =(_ZN6Global10lIlIIllIIlE_ptr - 0x7572FED0)
14.text:756F84C004408F E0ADDR4, PC, R4;GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE
15.text:756F84C4027094E7 LDR R7, [R4,R2]
16.text:756F84C814D0 4D E2SUBSP, SP, #0x14
17.text:756F84CC002097E5 LDR R2, [R7]
18.text:756F84D00C208D E5STRR2, [SP,#0x30+var_24]
19.text:756F84D4036094E7 LDR R6, [R4,R3]
20.text:756F84D80600A0 E1MOVR0, R6;int *
21.text:756F84DC72F2 FF EB BL pipi
22.text:756F84E0000050E3CMPR0, #0
23.text:756F84E4130000BA BLT loc_756F8538
24.text:756F84E8080086E2ADDR0, R6, #8;int *
25.text:756F84EC 6E F2 FF EB BL pipi
26.text:756F84F0000050E3CMPR0, #0
27.text:756F84F40F0000BA BLT loc_756F8538
28.text:756F84F8480086E2ADDR0, R6, #0x48;int *
29.text:756F84FC 6A F2 FF EB BL pipi
30.text:756F8500000050E3CMPR0, #0
31.text:756F85040B0000BA BLT loc_756F8538
32.text:756F8508300086E2ADDR0, R6, #0x30;int *
33.text:756F850C66F2 FF EB BL pipi
34.text:756F8510000050E3CMPR0, #0
35.text:756F8514070000BA BLT loc_756F8538
36.text:756F8518380086E2ADDR0, R6, #0x38;int *
37.text:756F851C62F2 FF EB BL pipi
38.text:756F8520000050E3CMPR0, #0
39.text:756F8524030000BA BLT loc_756F8538
40.text:756F8528400086E2ADDR0, R6, #0x40;int *
41.text:756F852C 5E F2 FF EB BL pipi
42.text:756F8530000050E3CMPR0, #0
43.text:756F8534010000AA BGE loc_756F8540
44.text:756F8538
45.text:756F8538 loc_756F8538;CODE XREF: IIIIIIIllll(void)+34↑j
46.text:756F8538;IIIIIIIllll(void)+44↑j ...
47.text:756F85380000A0 E3MOVR0, #0;int
48.text:756F853C 4E F2 FF EB BL _Z10llIIlIIIlli;llIIlIIIll(int)
49.text:756F8540
50.text:756F8540 loc_756F8540;CODE XREF: IIIIIIIllll(void)+84↑j
51.text:756F85400110A0 E3MOVR1, #1
52.text:756F85440400A0 E3MOVR0, #4;option
53.text:756F8548 AF CB FF EB BL prctl
54.text:756F854C72F2 FF EB BL getpid_0
55.text:756F855030339F E5 LDR R3, =(_ZN6Global10lIllllIllIE_ptr - 0x7572FED0)
56.text:756F8554035094E7 LDR R5, [R4,R3]
57.text:756F8558000085E5STRR0, [R5];Global::lIllllIllI
58.text:756F855C60F2 FF EB BL fork
59.text:756F8560010070E3 CMN R0, #1
60.text:756F8564040085E5STRR0, [R5,#(dword_757309F4 - 0x757309F0)]
61.text:756F85689200000ABEQ loc_756F87B8
62.text:756F856C
63.text:756F856C loc_756F856C;CODE XREF: IIIIIIIllll(void)+314↓j
64.text:756F856C000050E3CMPR0, #0
65.text:756F8570340000DA BLE loc_756F8648
66.text:756F85740080A0 E3MOVR8, #0
67.text:756F85780190A0 E3MOVR9, #1
68.text:756F857C08339F E5 LDR R3, =(_ZN6Global10IIlIIlIIlIE_ptr - 0x7572FED0)
69.text:756F858010108D E2ADDR1, SP, #0x30+var_20
70.text:756F8584380096E5 LDR R0, [R6,#(dword_75730EBC - 0x75730E84)];int
71.text:756F8588033094E7 LDR R3, [R4,R3]
72.text:756F858C0420A0 E3MOVR2, #4;unsigned int
73.text:756F8590108021E5STRR8, [R1,#-0x10]!
74.text:756F85940090C3 E5 STRB R9, [R3];Global::IIlIIlIIlI
75.text:756F8598 7B F2 FF EB BL read
76.text:756F859C EC129F E5 LDR R1, =(_ZN6Global6ThreadE_ptr - 0x7572FED0)
77.text:756F85A0 EC229F E5 LDR R2, =(_Z10IlIIlllIIlPv_ptr - 0x7572FED0)
78.text:756F85A4043085E2ADDR3, R5, #4;void *
79.text:756F85A8016094E7 LDR R6, [R4,R1]
80.text:756F85AC022094E7 LDR R2, [R4,R2];void(__cdecl)(void *)
81.text:756F85B00810A0 E1MOVR1, R8;pthread_attr_t *
82.text:756F85B40600A0 E1MOVR0, R6;int *
83.text:756F85B8 6D F1 FF EB BL pthread_create_0
84.text:756F85BC080050E1CMPR0, R8
85.text:756F85C0800000BA BLT loc_756F87C8
86.text:756F85C4
87.text:756F85C4 loc_756F85C4;CODE XREF: IIIIIIIllll(void)+334↓j
88.text:756F85C4 CC329F E5 LDR R3, =(_Z10IIlIlllllIPv_ptr - 0x7572FED0)
89.text:756F85C8040086E2ADDR0, R6, #4;int *
90.text:756F85CC0010A0 E3MOVR1, #0;pthread_attr_t *
91.text:756F85D0032094E7 LDR R2, [R4,R3];void(__cdecl)(void *)
92.text:756F85D40930A0 E3MOVR3, #9;void *
93.text:756F85D865F1 FF EB BL pthread_create_0
94.text:756F85DC000050E3CMPR0, #0
95.text:756F85E0 6C0000BA BLT loc_756F8798
96.text:756F85E4
97.text:756F85E4 loc_756F85E4;CODE XREF: IIIIIIIllll(void)+304↓j
98.text:756F85E40010A0 E3MOVR1, #0;pthread_attr_t *
99.text:756F85E8 AC229F E5 LDR R2, =(_Z11IIIlllIIIIIPv_ptr - 0x7572FED0)
100.text:756F85EC0130A0 E1MOVR3, R1;void *
101.text:756F85F0022094E7 LDR R2, [R4,R2];void(__cdecl)(void *)
102.text:756F85F4100086E2ADDR0, R6, #0x10;int *
103.text:756F85F8 5D F1 FF EB BL pthread_create_0
104.text:756F85FC0010A0 E3MOVR1, #0;pthread_attr_t *
105.text:756F860098229F E5 LDR R2, =(_Z11IIIlIIlIllIPv_ptr - 0x7572FED0)
106.text:756F86040130A0 E1MOVR3, R1;void *
107.text:756F8608022094E7 LDR R2, [R4,R2];void(__cdecl)(void *)
108.text:756F860C04008D E2ADDR0, SP, #0x30+var_2C;int *
109.text:756F861057F1 FF EB BL pthread_create_0
110.text:756F861488329F E5 LDR R3, =(_Z10IIllIIlIlIPv_ptr - 0x7572FED0)
111.text:756F861808008D E2ADDR0, SP, #0x30+var_28;int *
112.text:756F861C0010A0 E3MOVR1, #0;pthread_attr_t *
113.text:756F8620032094E7 LDR R2, [R4,R3];void(__cdecl)(void *)
114.text:756F86240130A0 E3MOVR3, #1;void *
115.text:756F862851F1 FF EB BL pthread_create_0
116.text:756F862C
117.text:756F862C loc_756F862C;CODE XREF: IIIIIIIllll(void)+250↓j
118.text:756F862C0C209D E5 LDR R2, [SP,#0x30+var_24]
119.text:756F8630003097E5 LDR R3, [R7]
120.text:756F86340100A0 E3MOVR0, #1
121.text:756F8638030052E1CMPR2, R3
122.text:756F863C 8D00001A BNE loc_756F8878
123.text:756F864014D0 8D E2ADDSP, SP, #0x14
124.text:756F8644 F083BD E8 LDMFD SP!, {R4-R9,PC}
125.text:756F8648;---------------------------------------------------------------------------
126.text:756F8648
127.text:756F8648 loc_756F8648;CODE XREF: IIIIIIIllll(void)+C0↑j
128.text:756F864872CB FF EB BL getpid
129.text:756F864C040085E5STRR0, [R5,#(dword_757309F4 - 0x757309F0)]
130.text:756F865023F2 FF EB BL fork
131.text:756F8654041085E2ADDR1, R5, #4;void *
132.text:756F8658080085E5STRR0, [R5,#(dword_757309F8 - 0x757309F0)]
133.text:756F865C0420A0 E3MOVR2, #4;unsigned int
134.text:756F8660 3C0096E5 LDR R0, [R6,#(dword_75730EC0 - 0x75730E84)];int
135.text:756F866456F2 FF EB BL write_0
136.text:756F8668083095E5 LDR R3, [R5,#(dword_757309F8 - 0x757309F0)]
137.text:756F866C010073E3 CMN R3, #1
138.text:756F86706400000ABEQ loc_756F8808
139.text:756F8674
140.text:756F8674 loc_756F8674;CODE XREF: IIIIIIIllll(void)+364↓j
141.text:756F8674000053E3CMPR3, #0
142.text:756F86780100A0 E3MOVR0, #1;option
143.text:756F867C0910A0 E3MOVR1, #9
144.text:756F8680 1F0000DA BLE loc_756F8704
145.text:756F868460CB FF EB BL prctl
146.text:756F868800129F E5 LDR R1, =(_ZN6Global6ThreadE_ptr - 0x7572FED0)
147.text:756F868C00229F E5 LDR R2, =(_Z10IlIIlllIIlPv_ptr - 0x7572FED0)
148.text:756F8690083085E2ADDR3, R5, #8;void *
149.text:756F8694016094E7 LDR R6, [R4,R1]
150.text:756F8698022094E7 LDR R2, [R4,R2];void(__cdecl)(void *)
151.text:756F869C0010A0 E3MOVR1, #0;pthread_attr_t *
152.text:756F86A00600A0 E1MOVR0, R6;int *
153.text:756F86A432F1 FF EB BL pthread_create_0
154.text:756F86A8000050E3CMPR0, #0
155.text:756F86AC590000BA BLT loc_756F8818
156.text:756F86B0
157.text:756F86B0 loc_756F86B0;CODE XREF: IIIIIIIllll(void)+384↓j
158.text:756F86B0 E0319F E5 LDR R3, =(_Z10IIlIlllllIPv_ptr - 0x7572FED0)
159.text:756F86B4040086E2ADDR0, R6, #4;int *
160.text:756F86B80010A0 E3MOVR1, #0;pthread_attr_t *
161.text:756F86BC032094E7 LDR R2, [R4,R3];void(__cdecl)(void *)
162.text:756F86C00130A0 E3MOVR3, #1;void *
163.text:756F86C4 2A F1 FF EB BL pthread_create_0
164.text:756F86C8000050E3CMPR0, #0
165.text:756F86CC450000BA BLT loc_756F87E8
166.text:756F86D0
167.text:756F86D0 loc_756F86D0;CODE XREF: IIIIIIIllll(void)+354↓j
168.text:756F86D0 CC319F E5 LDR R3, =(_Z10IIllIIlIlIPv_ptr - 0x7572FED0)
169.text:756F86D40010A0 E3MOVR1, #0;pthread_attr_t *
170.text:756F86D8032094E7 LDR R2, [R4,R3];void(__cdecl)(void *)
171.text:756F86DC0230A0 E3MOVR3, #2;void *
172.text:756F86E008008D E2ADDR0, SP, #0x30+var_28;int *
173.text:756F86E4
174.text:756F86E4 loc_756F86E4;CODE XREF: IIIIIIIllll(void)+2E4↓j
175.text:756F86E422F1 FF EB BL pthread_create_0
176.text:756F86E808009D E5 LDR R0, [SP,#0x30+var_28];int
177.text:756F86EC0010A0 E3MOVR1, #0;void **
178.text:756F86F0 A9 F1 FF EB BL pthread_join
179.text:756F86F4000096E5 LDR R0, [R6];int
180.text:756F86F80010A0 E3MOVR1, #0;void **
181.text:756F86FC A6 F1 FF EB BL pthread_join
182.text:756F8700 C9 FF FF EA B loc_756F862C
183.text:756F8704;---------------------------------------------------------------------------
184.text:756F8704
185.text:756F8704 loc_756F8704;CODE XREF: IIIIIIIllll(void)+1D0↑j
186.text:756F870440CB FF EB BL prctl
187.text:756F870803F2 FF EB BL getpid_0
188.text:756F870C0510A0 E1MOVR1, R5
189.text:756F87100420A0 E3MOVR2, #4;unsigned int
190.text:756F87140800A1 E5STRR0, [R1,#(dword_757309F8 - 0x757309F0)]!
191.text:756F8718340096E5 LDR